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ABSTRACT
This article traces the concept of reciprocity from its emergence in French philoso-
phy during the Enlightenment to its recent growth in the humanities and social sci-
ences. After charting the term’s accelerated use in French and English in the mod-
ern period, the article shows how its meaning has continually wavered between
exchange equivalence (barter) and generosity and obligation (the gift, the Golden
Rule). During the Enlightenment, these meanings converged in efforts to natural-
ize commerce and justify liberal economic reforms. A free-market society, it was
argued, would be fair and bountiful. Upon the failure of such reforms in the early
French Revolution, reciprocity and its new synonym “fraternity” became detached
from economic liberalism. As capitalism became increasingly associated with wealth
inequality in the nineteenth century, reciprocity became the watchword of capital-
ism’s critics, who tried to conceptualize social bonds in terms other than those of-
fered by Homo economicus.
In reciprocity, proﬁt cannot exist.
—Pierre Larousse, Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle
In recent decades, the concept of reciprocity has spread across the humanities andsocial sciences. It appears these days in a wide range of disciplines, from phi-losophy, politics, and economics to communications, religion, and behavioral
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science.1 Its rise in academic research is borne out by online catalogs and text col-
lections. JSTOR’s collection of more than 2,300 journals, for example, shows a dra-
matic increase in the term’s use since the 1980s (ﬁg. A1). It also shows a broaden-
ing of usage: before the 1970s, “reciprocity” referred mostly to international trade.
Since then, its sociological and philosophical meanings have predominated, even
in articles on business and economics (ﬁg. A2).2
This is not the ﬁrst time in history that invocations of reciprocity have suddenly
surged. Something similar occurred with the French réciprocité in the latter half of
the eighteenth century. Before 1750, the term appeared rarely—mostly in discus-
sions of commercial treaties and marriage contracts.3 After 1750, it burst into tracts
on civil society, political economy, rights and duties, and the social contract. It ac-
quired philosophical freight, referring to how individuals related to one another in
society—or how they should relate to one another.
Reciprocity is thus a modern concept. It emerged during the Enlightenment,
precociously in France, and has been invoked increasingly ever since. Curiously,
though, historians have tended to associate it with the pre- and early modern. Bor-
rowing from the cultural anthropology of archaic societies, medieval and early
modern European historians have employed reciprocity and the related concept
of gift giving to interpret a wide range of social practices, from clientelism and char-
1. For recent examples in each of these disciplines, see, for philosophy, Kazutaka Inamura, Justice and
Reciprocity in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); for politics,
Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter, “Vote-Buying and Reciprocity” (working paper, January 2010),
http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/ydepot/semin/texte0910/FIN2010VOT.pdf; for economics,
Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier, eds., The Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism
and Reciprocity, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006); for communication studies, Avery E. Holton, Mark
Coddington, Seth C. Lewis, and Homero Gil de Zúñiga, “Reciprocity and the News: The Role of Personal
and Social Media Reciprocity in News Creation and Consumption,” International Journal of Communication
9 (2015): 2526–47; for religious studies, Douglas J. Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity,
and Otherness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and for behavioral science, Samuel Bowles and Her-
bert Gintis, A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2011).
2. JSTOR titles with “reciprocity” in business and economics between 1980 and 2015 show a shift to-
ward sociological uses of the term. See, for example, Sebastien Kube, Michel André Maréchal, and Clem-
ens Puppe, “The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift-Exchange in the Workplace,” American Economic Review 102,
no. 4 (June 2012): 1644–62.
3. Examples of its use in pre-Enlightenment commercial treaties will be discussed below. For its use in
the jurisprudence on marriage contracts, see Philippe de Renusson, Traitez du douaire et de la garde-noble et
bourgeoise, qu’on appelle bail en plusieurs coustumes (Paris: La Comapgnie des libraires, 1724), 110; Antoine
Gaspard Boucher d’Argis,Principes sur la nullité dumariage, pour cause d’impuissance (London [Paris]: n.p., 1756).
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ity to religious conversions and early global commerce.4 Enlightenment scholars,
for their part, have found the concept of reciprocity (not the practice) in certain
strands of eighteenth-century thought, especially thewritings of Jean-JacquesRous-
seau. But they tend to refer to the concept in a general way and do not historicize the
term carefully, examining its precise uses and meanings.5 (Rousseau, in fact, never
invoked reciprocity, despite its growing currency at the time.)Moreover, their analy-
ses do not extend much beyond 1789. Meanwhile, modern historians have next to
nothing to say about reciprocity. Neither the concept nor the practiceﬁgures in analy-
ses of post-Enlightenment European societies.
Given the current state of the historiography, then, it would appear that reci-
procity died in the age of Rousseau, a time when early modern gift-giving culture
presumably gave way to modern capitalism.6 Such a conclusion, however, runs
4. Seminal studies of reciprocity and gift giving include Richard Thurnwald, Bánaro Society: Social Orga-
nization and Kinship System of a Tribe in the Interior of New Guinea (Lancaster, PA: New Era, 1916); Bronislaw
Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Paciﬁc: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes
of Melanesian New Guinea (London: Routledge, 1922); and Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Form and Reason for Ex-
change in Archaic Societies, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Norton, 1990). For historical studies of medieval
and early modern Europe that employ “gift giving” and “reciprocity,” see Sharon Kettering, “Brokerage
at the Court of Louis XIV,” The Historical Journal 36, no. 1 (March 1993): 69–87, and “Patronage in Early
Modern France,” French Historical Studies 17, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 839–62; Laurence Fontaine, L’économie
morale: Pauvreté, crédit et conﬁance dans l’Europe préindustrielle (Paris: Gallimard, 2008); and Natalie Zemon
Davis, The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000). For the use of rec-
iprocity and gift giving to interpret Viking conversions to Christianity, see AndersWinroth, The Conversion of
Scandinavia: Vikings, Merchants, and Missionaries in the Remaking of Northern Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2012). For gifts and reciprocity in the rise of commerce, see Martha Howell, Commerce be-
fore Capitalism in Europe, 1300–1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Anne Goldgar,
Tulipmania: Money, Honor, and Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
5. Jonathan Israel observes that radical Enlightenment philosophers sought to construct a new moral
order “exclusively on the principles of equity and reciprocity,” but that is that last occurrence of “reciproc-
ity” for the remaining thousand pages of the book Democratic Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 23. Paul de Man writes, “Reciprocity . . . for Rousseau is the very condition of love” in Alle-
gories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1979), 283. Additional studies associating Rousseau with the principle include Judith Still, Justice and
Difference in the Works of Rousseau: Bienfaisance and Pudeur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),
9, 68–81; Jean Starobinski, “Introduction,” in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondements
de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 15.
6. Associating reciprocity with precapitalist societies is often attributed to Karl Polanyi, The Great Trans-
formation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times (1944; Boston: Beacon, 1957). For a critique of this
premodern–modern dichotomy, see Clare Haru Crowston, “Credit and the Metanarrative of Modernity,”
French Historical Studies 34, no. 1 (2011): 7–19. In The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global Idea
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Harry A. Liebersohn argues that the late eighteenth cen-
tury saw a delegitimization of gift-giving practices, which looked corrupt from new normative perspectives
privileging commerce and rational administration. Reciprocity and gift giving would reemerge, he shows,
in the twentieth century but as concepts for understanding archaic rather than modern societies. In her
study of French Revolutionary novels, Geneviève Lafrance identiﬁes growing pessimism about the pros-
pects of reciprocity to create social happiness during the French Revolution in Qui perd gagne: Imaginaire
du don et Révolution française (Montreal: University of Montreal, 2008).
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counter to the evidence. Rather than declining with the rise of capitalism, the con-
cept appears to have emerged along with it. Invocations of reciprocity increased as
capitalism expanded—surging, as well shall see, in periods of contentious economic
change.
Despite reciprocity’s importance across themodern era, little is known about the
concept’s history. Themost developed account comes not from a historian but from
a cultural anthropologist. In Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-
Giving (1992), Annette B. Weiner traces the concept back to the medieval period,
when a “norm of reciprocity” began shaping descriptions of political society. (The
term, we will see, was rarely invoked before the Enlightenment.) In the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, she continues, the principle came to justify eco-
nomic liberalism: “Beginning with Thomas Hobbes, the notion in political philoso-
phy of a norm of reciprocity as a fundamental principle in human society entered
into speculations to justify the rise of a free-market economy without state inter-
ventions.”7 Seeking amoral basis for commercial capitalism, Enlightenment philos-
ophers asserted that “when people enter into reciprocal exchange [i.e., the mar-
ket], they become better people.”8 After the Enlightenment, Weiner argues, the
concept went from justifying free-market capitalism to providing a frame of refer-
ence for critiquing it. Thus, when anthropologists in the early twentieth century
began characterizing the exchange practices of archaic societies in terms of reci-
procity, they sought in these practices alternatives to, or the purer origins of, cap-
italism—“purer” for being less hierarchical, less utilitarian, and less alienating: “The
economic world of the ‘primitive’was viewed as both the antithesis and alter ego of
Western Homo œconomicus.”9
Packing six centuries of history into a few pages, Weiner’s sketch may not con-
vince historians. (Can Hobbes and Adam Smith really be lumped together as pio-
neers of economic liberalism?) But it serves her main purpose of exposing how an-
thropologists have unwittingly projected liberal economic notions inherited from
the Enlightenment onto archaic societies, making those societies’ exchange practices
7. Annette B. Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1992), 28.
8. Ibid. Historians have developed this point. See Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Polit-
ical Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). For the
links between morality and political economy during the Enlightenment, see Emma Rothschild, Economic
Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001);
John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and
the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
9. Weiner, Inalienable Possessions, 30. She adds, “These projected images of reciprocity as the basis for
an equitable economics in which Western society had originally participated were widely agreed upon.”
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appear more balanced than they really were. Reciprocity obscures hierarchies, she
insists, not only in archaic societies but also inmodern ones—a pointwell worth con-
sidering, given the concept’s growing prominence in the social sciences these days.10
More relevant for this article, however, is her hypothesis of a historical shift from
reciprocity as a justiﬁcation for free-market capitalism during the Enlightenment
to reciprocity as capitalism’s antithesis and alter ego in later periods. She identiﬁes
this change but does not explain it. In what follows, I argue that it began in the
age of the French Revolution—a time when faith in economic liberalism’s promise
of social peace and mutual beneﬁts began to ﬂag. Although reciprocity may have
been useful for delegitimizing privilege and patronage before 1789, once theOld Re-
gime collapsed, the concept failed to legitimize economic liberalism and, eventually,
was used to critique it.
Before beginning this account, it may be helpful to explain why I, a historian of
political culture, have decided to venture into conceptual history. A few years ago,
I set out to write a narrative of the French Revolution from the perspective of rec-
iprocity and redistribution. Drawing on cultural anthropology, I aimed to demod-
ernize the revolution by showing how these conceptual tools, usually reserved for
studying premodern societies, could be used to study modern ones as well. After
all, if social scientists in other disciplines were putting them to good use to analyze
the present and recent past, why were historians limiting their use of them to the
pre- and early modern? As it turns out, redistribution has been helpful for inter-
preting French Revolutionary politics.11 Reciprocity, however, has not. It crumbled
like sand as soon as I tried to use it to drill into the past. What is reciprocity to begin
with? Does it refer to equivalent exchanges (barter) or to generosity and obligation
(gift giving)? Do exchanges have to be balanced to be reciprocal, or does any ex-
change qualify, even if it instantiates hierarchy or indebtedness? And is reciprocity
ultimately a matter of economic exchange or of the honor, dignity, andmutual rec-
ognition of the exchangers? The more I delved into the theoretical literature on
reciprocity, the more unwieldy the concept became. It referred to too many differ-
ent things.
My doubts crystallized upon reading David Graeber’s Debt: The First Five Thou-
sand Years (2013). Skeptical about the concept, the anthropologist observes, “If
10. Ibid., 150–55.
11. I am currently completing a narrative of the French Revolution from the perspective of redistrib-
utive politics. For my early efforts to interpret revolutions through the lens of redistribution, see my “Rév-
olution et redistribution: Réﬂexions sur la France et l’Égypte,” La Vie des idées (April 23, 2013), http://www
.laviedesidees.fr/Revolution-et-redistribution.html, and in English as “Revolution and Redistribution: Re-
ﬂections on France and Egypt,” Books and Ideas.net (2013), http://www.booksandideas.net/Revolution
-and-Redistribution.html.
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one has decided that all relations are based on reciprocity, one can always deﬁne
the term so broadly as to make it true.”12 That was my problem. In stretching rec-
iprocity to encompass a wide range of social relations before, during, and after the
French Revolution, it lost all explanatory power. It certainly could not explain his-
torical change. I gradually came to share Graeber’s and Weiner’s misgivings about
the concept: in implying equity and balance (a legacy of Enlightenment theories of
commercial society), reciprocity imbues social relations with an undue degree of
egalitarian normativity, obscuring hierarchy and debt. Indeed, the concept’s pro-
pensity to obscure structural imbalances is precisely why economic liberals during
the Enlightenment found it so useful. It helped them in their campaign against
privilege by allowing them to foreground civil equality while throwing wealth in-
equality and indebtedness into the background. The two anthropologists reject rec-
iprocity on these very grounds and propose conceptual alternatives—“debt” (Graeber)
and “inalienable possessions” (Weiner)—concepts that better account for systemic
power asymmetries.13
While grappling with these methodological challenges, I stumbled upon Google
Books Ngram Viewer and discovered that the term “réciprocité” gained currency
in the very period I was studying. In examining its early uses, I discerned meanings
and tensions that resonated with the ones I had encountered in the theoretical lit-
erature on gift giving and reciprocity. It struckme that we are still entangled in phil-
osophical knots formedmore than two centuries ago. By unpicking those knots—by
historicizing reciprocity’s meanings, uses, and political implications—I aimed to dis-
cover patterns in how social relations have been understood since the Enlighten-
ment. At the very least, I hoped to understand how the conceptﬁgured in the French
Revolution. Did notions of reciprocity shape revolutionary ideals? Did the revolu-
tion reshape notions of reciprocity? With these questions, I abandoned the search
for reciprocal social practices and set out to historicize the concept.
What follows is a history of reciprocity in the eighteenth century, when the term
ﬁrst gained currency as a philosophical concept. I begin by charting its rise in
French texts and comparing its use frequency with the English “reciprocity” and
other key Enlightenment and Revolutionary terms, such as “liberty,” “equality,”
12. David Graeber, Debt: The First Five Thousand Years (2011; repr., New York: Melville House, 2014),
413 n. 21. Graeber critiques reciprocity (89–126) for its ties to classical economic theories of barter. In my
view, his effort to replace the concept of reciprocity with that of debt amounts to privileging one side of
a conceptual dichotomy running through reciprocity since the eighteenth century—the obligation side
over the exchange-equivalence side. His great contribution to exchange theory, I believe, is to have iden-
tiﬁed the political violence inherent in quantifying obligations as debts that must be repaid.
13. Ibid., 89–126. For an elaboration of Weiner’s concept of “inalienable possessions,” see Maurice
Godelier, The Engima of the Gift, trans. Nora Scott (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).
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and “fraternity.” I then discuss the concept’s intellectual and social origins. I locate
its intellectual origins in a shift from subjugation to moral equality as the philo-
sophical basis of societal obligations. The term’s dramatic rise in French texts after
1750, however, owed to social factors, speciﬁcally, the rise of commercial and ﬁ-
nancial capitalism. In radically altering social relations, capitalism sparked philo-
sophical reﬂection on the nature of social bonds. Next, I examine the term’s mean-
ings. I identify a tension between reciprocity as the voluntary and utilitarian
exchange of equivalents (barter) and reciprocity as exchange inspired by generos-
ity and obligation (the gift, the Golden Rule). Economic liberals of the Enlighten-
ment tried to fuse these meanings, but their compound proved to be unstable. It
exploded in the French Revolution, when failed experiments with liberal economic
policies fueled antipathy toward unshared wealth accumulation. Throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (discussed brieﬂy in the conclusion), reciproc-
ity’s meaning continued to waver between exchange equivalence and generosity
and obligation—between barter and the Golden Rule. But it now stood opposed to
proﬁt seeking and free trade. It became, as Weiner observes, free-market capital-
ism’s “antithesis and alter ego.”
THE RISE OF RÉCIPROCITÉ : TEXTUAL TRENDS
Although the French adjective réciproque dates from the fourteenth century (a cog-
nate of the Latin reciprocus), the substantivenoun réciprocité appeared rarely in French
texts before the Enlightenment. Nor did the noun exist in classical Latin; the closest
termone canﬁnd is the clunky sicmutuo implicantur. Online text collections show that
“réciprocité” did not gain currency until the mid-eighteenth century.14 Although
data culled from online resources must be treated with caution—there are omis-
sions and redundancies in the result sets—they all point to the same conclusion:
“réciprocité” appeared more frequently in absolute and relative terms after 1750
(ﬁg. A4 andA5).15 The English “reciprocity” lagged behind the French term by about
14. The online resources consulted for this study include Google Ngram Viewer, Gale’s collections “The
Making of the Modern World” and “Eighteenth Century Collections Online,” and ARTFL-Frantext. “The
Making of the Modern World” text collection shows only two tracts with “réciprocité” between 1600
and 1700 but 19 tracts between 1700 and 1750, most of which concern trade. The ﬁgure jumps dramat-
ically to 347 tracts for the period between 1751 and 1800. Google Books also identiﬁes only two
publications containing the word “réciprocité” before 1700, albeit different ones than “The Making of
the Modern World.” For the fourteenth-century appearance of the adjective “réciproque,” see Trésor de
la langue française, Centre national de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales, etymology for “réciproque,”
http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/r%C3%A9ciproque.
15. For a study of the limitations of Google Ngram Viewer, see Eitan Adam Pechenick, Christopher M.
Danforth, and Peter Sheridan Dodds, “Characterizing the Google Books Corpus: Strong Limits to Infer-
ences of Socio-Cultural and Linguistic Evolution,” PLoS One 10, no. 10 (2015): 1–24.
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20 years.16 True, the synonym “reciprocation” appeared earlier, but “reciprocity”
overtook it in the 1780s (ﬁg. A6). Overall, anglophone writers were less inclined
to use either term—”reciprocation” or “reciprocity”—than the French were to use
“réciprocité.”17 According to Google NgramViewer, the French invoked the concept
7 to 10 times more frequently than their anglophone counterparts in the latter half
of the century. According to “The Making of the Modern World,” the French ap-
peared to have done so twice as often. These data suggest a greater interest in, or anx-
ieties about, social bonds on the part of the French.
Lest Google Ngram frequencies seem too low to be signiﬁcant (ﬁg. A4), it is
worth noting that although “réciprocité” has not appeared as often as “liberté” or
“égalité” across the modern era, its frequency approximates that of the synonym
“fraternité,” except during the revolutions of 1789, 1848, and 1917 (World War I),
when fraternité surpasses it (ﬁg. A7).18
Other evidence corroborates reciprocity’s rise in the latter half of the eighteenth
century. The term appeared with different frequencies in two editions of François
Véron Duverger de Forbonnais’s Élements du commerce, published nearly a half cen-
tury apart (1754 and 1796). A member of the Gournay circle, a group of political
economists pioneering antimercantilist theories, Forbonnais took the innovative
step of placing commerce—and reciprocity—at the heart of all social orders, “prim-
itive” and “civilized.” No longer limited to international relations, reciprocity be-
came a core principle of civil society as well.19 But whereas Forbonnais himself
used the term sparingly in the 1754 edition, the redactors of a new edition in
1796 multiplied its use. In the ﬁrst edition, the noun “réciprocité” appears only
16. Although Google Ngram, which shows the proportionate usage of terms, indicates spikes in the
early eighteenth century (ﬁg. 4), these are statistically insigniﬁcant because it indicates the relative, not
absolute, frequencies of terms among all terms appearing in the Google Books corpus. In absolute terms,
the early eighteenth-century spike refers to only one title between 1710 and 1718. The mid-eighteenth-
century spike between 1755 and 1766, however, consists of 97 titles.
17. For the emergence of the English “reciprocity” in the mid-eighteenth century, see the etymologies
in Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Oxford: Clarendon, 1910), 503; Rob-
ert K. Barnhart, The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 641. The ﬁrst
appearance in English is attributed to William Blackstone. In his 1766 Commentaries of the Laws of England
(London, 1765–69), he argued that contracts cannot legally exist without at least some degree of exchange,
or “reciprocity,” between the two contracting parties: “Any degree of reciprocity will prevent the pact from
being nude” (2:445); cited in Sir James A. H. Murray, The Oxford English Dictionary, 10 vols. (Oxford: Clar-
endon, 1933), 8:243.
18. Several nineteenth-century dictionaries and philosophical tracts take “fraternité” to be a synonym
for “réciprocité.” See, for example, Pierre Larousse’s deﬁnition: “Réciprocité et mutualité ou mutualisme,
solidarité et fraternité sont, pour ainsi dire, des synonymes.” Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siécle, 17 vols.
(Paris: Administration du Grand dictionnaire universel, 1875), 13:779.
19. I would like to thank William Sewell for sharing a partial draft of his work on Forbonnais, which
teases out the political economist’s “social bond” theory.
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once and the adjective “réciproque” on only 37 pages (across 808 total pages in two
volumes). In the French Revolutionary edition, “réciprocité” appears on 7 pages
and “réciproque” on 59 (across 912 pages in two volumes)—a dramatic increase.20
Another indication of reciprocity’s rising importance in the latter half of the
eighteenth century can be found in its occurrence in social contract theories.
Whereas Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Du contrat social of 1762 contains no occurrence
of the term, the social contract of Urbain-Firmin Piault, presented to the National
Convention in 1795 during debates about a new constitution, contained 14. For
Piault (son of a royal counselor and future mayor of the tenth arrondissement of
Paris in the early nineteenth century), reciprocity held republics together: “reci-
procity and equality are the bases of the social contract, which bind members indi-
vidually and collectively.”21 The use of reciprocity in social contract theories would
continue into the nineteenth century.22
Eighteenth-century dictionaries failed to signal reciprocity’s philosophical im-
portance. The Nouveau dictionnaire universel des arts et des sciences, which was the ﬁrst
to provide an entry for the noun, deﬁned it simply as “of reciprocal quality.”23 Sim-
ilarly, the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française of 1762 deﬁned it as “the state and
character of that which is reciprocal.”24 The 1768 edition of Dictionnaire royal,
français-anglais et anglais-français tiré des meilleurs auteurs ﬂagged its entry with a code
indicating “a dubious word or expression . . . about which authors are divided.” The
ﬂag was dropped from later editions, however, suggesting that the term had ac-
quired semantic stability.25 The concept’s philosophical signiﬁcance was better reg-
istered in nineteenth-century dictionaries. Pierre Larousse’s Grand dictionnaire uni-
versel du XIXe siècle (1866–88) offered a mini-essay on the subject (see its length in
ﬁg. A3), replete with the latest meditations in moral philosophy, political economy,
20. François Véron Duverger de Forbonnais, Élements du commerce: Nouvelle edition, 2 vols. (Paris:
Imprimérie de Chaigneau aîné, 1796), 2:260. For the earlier edition, see Forbonnais, Élements du commerce,
2nd ed., 2 vols. (Leyde et se trouve à Paris: Braisson, 1754).
21. Urban-Firmin Piault, Traité de l’esprit des sociétés nationales, suivi d’un Plan de contrat social et de consti-
tution de gouvernement (Paris: Pernier, 1799–1800 [year 8]), 344. (All French translations in this article are
the author’s.) The “plan” had been presented to the National Convention in Messidor, year 3.
22. Larousse remarked on the term’s growing importance in social contract theory in Dictionnaire
universel du XIXe siècle, 779.
23. Thomas Dyche, Nouveau dictionnaire universel des arts et des sciences, françois, latin et anglois: contenant la
signiﬁcation des mots de ces trois langues et des termes propres de chaque état et profession: avec l’explication de tout ce
que renferment les arts et les sciences, trans. P. E. Pézenas et l’abbé J.-F. Féraud, 2 vols. (Avignon: Chez la Vve
de Fr. Girard), 2:310.
24. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 17 vols. (Paris: Vve de Bernard Brunet, 1762), 2:553.
25. Abel Boyer, Dictionnaire royal, français-anglais et anglais-français tiré des meilleurs auteurs, 2 vols. (Bâle:
Chez Jean Schweighauser, 1768–69), 1:555 (French to English). The editions of 1771, 1773, and 1786
dropped the warning about the term’s novelty and imprecision.
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and social contract theory. The fact that no entry for the term appeared in Denis
Didérot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie of the mid-eighteenth century
but 11 paragraphs were devoted to it in Larousse’s Grand dictionnaire universel a cen-
tury later attests to the dramatic development of the concept.26
Taken together, online catalogs and text collections, serial editions of Enlighten-
ment texts, and contemporary dictionaries all show “réciprocité” emerging in the
mid-eighteenth century and appearing more frequently thereafter. But what ac-
counts for the concept’s emergence? And how did it become a key concept in the-
ories of civil society?
FROM SUBJUGATION TO MORAL EQUALITY
Before it gained currency during the Enlightenment, “réciprocité” was limited to
the jurisprudence on marriage contracts and post-1648 commercial treaties.27 As
a legal term, it referred to the claims widows and widowers could make concerning
mutual gifts exchanged at the time of matrimony. The term’s appearance in com-
mercial treaties was more frequent, though still relatively rare. But it was from this
latter usage that its entry into theories of civil society was derived. Perhaps surpris-
ingly from our perspective, “reciprocity” did not initially refer to exchange equiv-
alence or trade balance. It signaled equal standing and mutual recognition—prin-
ciples that were not to be taken for granted in a hierarchical world fraught with
dynastic rivalries and religious strife. For example, the commercial treaty between
Catholic Spain and the Calvinist Dutch Republic of 1651, drafted in French, stipu-
lated, “The subjects of Seigneur the King [Spain] will reciprocally hold the same
rights and liberties in navigation and trafﬁc, with regard to the Seigneurs of the
United Provinces, as their own subjects havewith regard to the King of Spain, given
the understanding of reciprocity and equality on all sides.”28 Some historians today
question whether the Peace of Westphalia really marked a turning point in inter-
national relations toward national sovereignty.29 It seems tome, however, that reci-
procity in this passage, at the very least, pointed to something new: the presump-
26. According to the ARTFL online text collection, “réciprocité” appeared 17 times in the 17 volumes of
the Encyclopédie, even though it did not receive an entry.
27. The Making of the Modern World text collection shows only 10 occurrences for “réciprocité” be-
tween 1600 and 1730. All refer to commercial treaties. A writer in 1778 acknowledged this etymology
in qualifying his use of the term with the phrase, “pour parler le langage de nos vieux traités” in Louis Ga-
briel, comte du Buat, Les maximes du gouvernement monarchique, pour servir de suite aux Éléments de la politique,
4 vols. (London: n.p., 1778), 1:20.
28. Theophraste Renaudot, ed., Recueil des Gazettes nouvelles, ordinaires et extraordinaires (Paris: Du Bu-
reau d’Adresse, aux Galleries du Louvre, devant la rue S. Thomas, 1651), 59.
29. For revisionist interpretations of the Peace of Westphalia, see Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, In-
ternational Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 251–
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tion of equal standing and moral equality among sovereigns of different faiths and
political orders. The symmetry extended to merchants as well. Those living in an
ally’s jurisdiction were to receive the same “rights and liberties” (privileges) as the
ally’s domestic traders. In early uses of “reciprocity,” then, mutual recognition of
equal standing trumped considerations of rank, religion, and regime type.
Reciprocity appeared more frequently with the rise of doux commerce in the mid-
eighteenth century. Doux commerce—the theory that commerce civilizes by strength-
ening bonds of utility and sentiment—imbued reciprocity with philosophical and
sociological signiﬁcance.30 Forbonnais spearheaded this use in the 1750s, we have
seen, but the trend continued. By the 1770s and 1780s, it was common to imagine
foreign and domestic relations adhering to the same principle: “Reciprocity is as
necessary in relations between nations as it is in relations between individuals,”
propounded a French political economist in 1785, at the height of free-trade nego-
tiations after the American War of Independence.31 The view was echoed during
the French Revolution. “All great laws . . . of trade and commerce, whether with re-
spect to the intercourse of individuals or nations,” insisted Thomas Paine in Rights of
Man, “are laws of mutual and reciprocal interest.”32 The moral and economic came
together in reciprocity. Stock phrases such as “reciprocity of goods, “of services,” “of
87; Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (Lon-
don: Verso, 2003). A nineteenth-century discussion of reciprocity’s origins traces the concept back to the
Treaty of Utrecht (1713); see Freeman Hunt, “American Reciprocity and British Free Trade,” Hunt’s Mer-
chants’ Magazine and Commercial Review, 23, no. 4 (1850): 415. Examples of “réciprocité” in discussions of
international trade after the Treaty of Utrecht include the “avertissement” in Traité de commerce, navigation
et marine, entre La France, et les villes Anséatiques: Conclu à Paris le 28 septembre 1716 (Paris: Collombat, 1717);
and Charles-Philippe, vicomte de Patin, Le commerce maritime fondé sur le droit de la nature & des gens, sur
l’autorité des loix civiles & des traitez de paix, & rétabli dans sa liberté naturelle traduit du Latin de M. Pattyn,
augmenté & enrichi des notes de l’auteur dans cette edition (Malines: Chez Laurent Vander Elst, 1727), 108.
30. The historical literature on doux commerce is vast. The seminal work on the topic is Hirschman,
Passions and the Interests. For further on doux commerce, see Daniel Gordon, Citizens without Sovereignty:
Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Da-
vid A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Boston: Houghton
Mifﬂin, 2007), 52–83; Paul Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). For helpful references to this vast literature, see the bibli-
ographies in Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue; Anoush Fraser Terjanian, Commerce and Its Discontents in
Eighteenth-Century French Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
31. Anonymous,Réponse à la brochure intitulée Le pour et le contre (n.p., 1785), 26. The phrasewas repeated
but with “sovereigns” in the place of “nations” in a publication of the same year: Jean-Baptiste Briatte,
Étonnement de l’Europe ou Examen des différens entre S. M. I. et la République des Provinces Unies (Frankfurt:
n.p., 1785), 68. Another example of reciprocity as a natural law applying to individuals, societies, and
nations appears in M. Le Trône [Guillaume-François Le Trosne], De l’administration provincial et de la réforme
de l’impôt, 2 vols. (Basle: se trouve à Paris chez Pierre J. Duplain, 1788), 1:57n.
32. Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings, ed. Mark Philp (1791; Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 216.
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resources,” “of good deeds, “of respect,” and “of sentiments” became standard fare
in philosophical treatises and often appeared together.33 “The reciprocity of services
and respect among the Romans,” asserted a philosopher seeking the ancient origins
of modern law, “was so precious among the Romans . . . that it bound Patricians and
Plebeians; it bound the whole Empire together.”34
This fusion of the moral and economic in the concept of reciprocity reveals a
paradigmatic shift in notions of obligation from subjugation to moral equality. Prior
to this shift, the use of coercion to enforce obligations—obedience, deference, trib-
ute, taxes—was considered neither unusual nor necessarily evil. Violence, or the
threat of it, was seen as the commonmeans for reaching agreements andmaintain-
ing order.35 As Hobbes observed: “for the Laws of Nature . . . , unto themselves,
without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to
our natural passions. . . . Covenants without the sword are but words.”36 This view
began to change in the late seventeenth century. In this early period of the Enlight-
enment, as Keith Baker has noted, “subjugation [was] replaced as a principle of
order by the moral obligations men owe one another as rational creatures and
members of a common human species.”37 John Locke put the view evenmore suc-
cinctly: “It is not fear of punishment that binds us, but our determination of what is
right.”38
This shift from hierarchy and subjugation to moral equality and reciprocity is
discernible across the early modern period. In his 1610 petition calling for the ex-
pulsion of the Jesuits after the assassination of Henry IV (perpetrated by a Jesuit
priest), the lawyer Pierre de la Martelière rejected reciprocity as a basis for political
33. Several of these stock phrases appeared as examples under the entry for “réciprocité” in the
Dictionnaire de l’Académie française of 1762. Numerous treatises on political economy and civil society com-
bined them as well.
34. Anonymous, Les loix puisées chez les grecs, développées par les romains, aujourd’hui base du droit public et
civil des nations policées, 2 tomes (Paris: Babuty ﬁls, 1765), 1:16.
35. For the perceived normalcy of war before the Enlightenment, see Bell, The First Total War, 5; for the
perceived normalcy of coercion in governing, see Arno J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French
and Russian Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 71.
36. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Common-wealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil
(London: Andrew Crooke, 1651), 103.
37. Keith M. Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History,” in
Main Trends in Cultural History: Ten Essays, ed. Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (Amsterdam: Rodopi,
1994), 110. Baker is summarizing Louis Dumont’s thesis in Homo Æqualis: genèse et épanouissement de
l’idéologie économique (Paris: Gallimard, 1977). For another overview of Dumont’s thesis, which also stresses
the shift from subjugation to morality, see Marcel Gauchet, “De l’avènement de l’individu à la découverte
de la société,” Revue européenne des sciences sociales 22, no. 68 (1984): 451–63, esp. 455.
38. Cited in J. B. Schneewind, “Locke’s Moral Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed.
Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 214, from Locke’s Essays on the Law of Na-
ture.
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obligations: “There is nothing more natural regarding obligations than that the ﬁrst
[obligation], and more precise than reciprocity, is that people are obliged to be
faithful and obedient to their Prince, while the Prince is expected to protect his sub-
jects.”39 Contrast that statement with one made a century and a half later by
Claude-Joseph de Ferrière, a jurist and admirer of Roman law. Far from dismissing
reciprocity, Ferrière took it to be a “general law,” one premised on moral equality:
“Just as a Vassal who mistreats his Seigneur loses his ﬁef, it is just, by the law of
reciprocity, that the Seigneur who mistreats his Vassal, and who becomes his ty-
rant, should also lose his rights with regard to him.”40 To be sure, hierarchy is
not altogether absent—we still have lords and vassals—but the “law of reciprocity”
placed mutual obligations on more egalitarian terrain.
Another sign of subjugation’s decline and reciprocity’s rise appears in an abridged
1755 edition of Jean Bodin’s sixteenth-century Les six livres de la République. Retitled
Abrégé de la République de Bodin, the new edition was substantially revised by a mag-
istrate from Bordeaux and member of the Royal Council, Jean-Charles de Lavie. In
his preface, Lavie admitted to having taken great liberties in restructuring Bodin’s
text. It appears he took great liberties with the content as well. For unlike Bodin,
who never used the term, Lavie put reciprocity at the heart of the social order: “Mu-
tual assistance is an indispensable obligation in every civil society; as such, civil soci-
ety forms a singlemoral individual. Union canonly subsist through reciprocity. If one
violates it, society ceases.”41 For Lavie, reciprocity was the sine qua non of society.
And society, in his view, was a homogeneous moral totality, “a single moral individ-
ual.”42 Not that he eschewed inequalities; he believed they were inevitable. But he
attributed them to the uneven distribution of talents and strengths, not to any on-
tology of rank (caste, orders, estates). Inequalities were incidental, not essential, in
civil society. Lavie’s reasoning exempliﬁes what Pierre Rosanvallon describes as
the “secondarization” of social differences during the Enlightenment.43 Social differ-
ences were acknowledged but treated as accidents of nature or history, which in no
way impinged on the fundamental premise of moral equality.44 This very premise
39. Pierre de LaMartelière, Plaidoyé de Me. Pierre de La Martelière, . . . faict en Parlement. . . . Les dix-septiesme
et dix-neuﬁesme décembre mil six cens unze, pour le recteur et université de Paris, . . . contre les jésuites, demandeurs et
requérans l’enthérinement des lettres patentes par eux obtenuës de pouvoir . . . enseigner en ladite université (Paris:
Chez Jean Petit-Pas, 1612), 41.
40. Claude Joseph de Ferrière, Dictionnaire de droit et de pratique, contenant l’explication des termes de droit,
d’ordonnances de coutumes et de pratique: Avec les juridictions de France, 2 vols. (Paris: Saugrain ﬁls, 1755), 2:104.
41. Charles de Lavie, Abrégé de la République de Bodin, 2 vols. (London: Jean Nourse, 1755), 2:267.
42. Ibid.
43. Pierre Rosanvallon, La société des égaux (Paris: Le Seuil, 2013), 73–88.
44. Ibid. According to Rosanvallon, in the nineteenth century, science would reessentialize social dif-
ferences to justify social hierarchies (135–46). Another example of this secondarization of social differences
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appears in Lavie’s invocation of the Golden Rule, which he formulated positively
(“do unto others”) and negatively (“do not do unto others”). “All moral and civil
laws,” he insisted, “are derivations of these twin principles.”45
None of this appears in Bodin’s original text. On the contrary, the sixteenth-
century editions stressed subordination, not reciprocity. Bodin’s solution to the
problem of vagrancy, for example, was not “mutual aid,” as Lavie would have it,
but expulsion. Vagrants—“beasts and trash,” in his view—were to be chased from
the republic by armies.46 Bodin advised treating others according to rank and not,
as Lavie believed, according to how one wished to be treated (the Golden Rule).47
For Bodin, hierarchy, not reciprocity, dictated the terms of generosity: “The laws of
liberality command that one consider carefully to whom one gives, how much one
gives, when and where, for what ends, and the power of the one who gives.”48
The concept of reciprocity thus grew out of changing ideas about social obliga-
tion. As subjugation gave way to moral equality, reciprocity came to be seen as the
essence of social bonds. But it was a largely empty category. It may have implied
moral equality and mutual recognition, but the speciﬁc kinds of exchanges it re-
ferred to could vary according to one’s political and philosophical commitments.
Such commitments came increasingly into conﬂict with each other toward the
end of the century, especially after 1789. Before considering those conﬂicts, we will
examine capitalism’s role in accelerating the term’s use in the latter half of the eigh-
teenth century.
CAPITALISM AND THE REIMAGINING OF SOCIAL BONDS
Moral equality was thus a conceptual precondition for the emergence of réciproc-
ité. But what accounts for the sudden explosion of the concept in French philos-
ophy after 1750? The most obvious factor was the explosion of print. More lenient
during the Enlightenment appears in Gabriel, le comte Du Buat, Les maximes du gouvernement monarchique,
1:2: “I have proven that men are essentially equal, and that the sole consequence of this equality is the
equal right to happiness; but from this primitive equality derives the necessity of an inequality of condition,
of rights, of advantages, and of prerogatives, which is not an iniquity, as long as they correspond to acci-
dents . . . such as birth, fortune, and education.”
45. Lavie, Abrégé de la République de Bodin, 1:228.
46. Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la République, 6 vols. (Geneva: Estienne Gamonet, 1629), 5:762.
47. Lavie, Abrégé de la République de Bodin, 1:228.
48. Bodin, Les six livres de la République, 5:747. Early modern theorists of social order, such as Bodin and
the early seventeenth-century jurist Charles Loyseau, did use the adjective “réciproque,” but it did not con-
vey the principle of moral equality. As in La Martelière’s statement cited above, different obligations per-
tained to different ranks. For Loyseau, harmony, not equivalence, was the operative principle of obligation,
and he rejected equality outright: “We cannot live together in a condition of equality, but of necessity it
must be that some command and others obey.” A Treatise on Orders and Plain Dignities, ed. and trans. Lloyd
A. Howell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5.
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censorship policies in the late 1740s, together with rising literacy, spurred the pub-
lishing industry, offering more occasions for the term to appear.49 But a print boom
explains only the absolute increase in the term’s use (ﬁg. A5), not its relative in-
crease (ﬁg. A4). Why did writers invoke réciprocité more often when they picked
up their pens?
A prosopography of the hundreds of writers who used the term in the eigh-
teenth century will not shed much light on the matter. They were too diverse.
Some were wealthy, others modest; some supported state centralization, others
feudalism; some invoked reciprocity to justify free markets, others (albeit fewer)
to justify privilege and even forms of protosocialism. Moreover, no writer before
the nineteenth century, with the exception of the idiosyncratic Rétif de la Bretonne
(discussed below), offered any sustained reﬂection on the term. Reciprocity en-
tered French philosophy without much exposition or debate. Writers assumed
their readers knew what it meant, even as they gave it different meanings.
To explain the rise of reciprocity talk after 1750, we must consider the broader
context. A growing preoccupation with political economy, I believe, was a key fac-
tor. Reciprocity appeared often in tracts on commerce and ﬁnances, which prolif-
erated in the Old Regime’s ﬁnal decades. But these tracts also advanced theories
about civil society, which raises the question: Why were political economists so
compelled to connect the two? Why did they try to tether economic reciprocity
(“la réciprocité des biens et des services”) to moral reciprocity (“la réciprocité des
sentiments et des bons ofﬁces” and “la réciprocité des droits et des devoirs”)?
The growth of capitalism, I believe, goes a long way in explaining these efforts. It
spurred theorizing about social bonds—and thus reciprocity—by conditioning indi-
viduals to see others differently (as civil equals) and to feel about others differently
(as fellow humans worthy of empathy and assistance). In radically transforming
social relations, capitalism also stoked anxieties about the social order, thereby
prompting efforts to better understand the nature of social bonds and how to
strengthen them. Reciprocity talk expressed these views, sentiments, and anxieties.
Capitalismmade civil equality thinkable by replacing the “Great Chain of Being”
with horizontal conceptions of society. In his study of the booming genre of
newssheets in the late Old Regime, Colin Jones locates the emergence of the civic-
49. For the post-1750 print boom, see Henri-Jean Martin, “Une croissance séculaire,” in Histoire de
l’édition française. 2: Le livre triomphant, 1660–1830, ed. Roger Chartier and Henri-Jean Martin (Paris: Fayard,
1990), 113–27; for the loosening of censorship restrictions and the creation of “tacit permissions” under the
directorship of Guillaume-Chrétien de Lamoignon de Malesherbes, see Daniel Roche, “La censure,” in the
same volume, 88–98. For rising literacy rates, see François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, Reading and Writing:
Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 5–58.
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minded consumer: in juxtaposing advertisements and commentary (often conveyed
surreptitiously in news columns and book reviews), the newssheets accustomed
readers to see themselves and others as enlightened citizens.50 Caste was irrelevant
in this commercial space, where “‘compatriots’”were encouraged “‘to communicate
reciprocally among themselves their needs and their thoughts.’”51 William Sewell
also ﬁnds capitalism spreading notions of civil equality. He sees this occurring in the
Parisian promenades such as the Tuileries Gardens and the Palais Royal—quasi-
anonymous commercial spaces where individuals with enough means could sport
the latest fashions. Social mingling and conspicuous consumption had the effect of
“loosening the link between appearance and status,” making civil equality think-
able.52 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, Sewell con-
cludes, marked the arrival of the abstracted individual created by capitalism: the
citizen.53
Seeing others as civil equals was one thing; feeling sentimental attachments to
them was another. Here, again, capitalism played a role. It was through commer-
cialized culture, especially print and theater, that notions of empathy and civic sol-
idarity were popularized. Melodrama was especially effective in this regard. Com-
mercial theaters performing the new genre sprouted up in Paris, the provinces, and
the colonies in the latter half of the eighteenth century.54 Several philosophes, no-
tably Denis Diderot, praised melodrama for its didactic value: in summoning spec-
tators to empathize with the trials and tribulations of ordinary individuals, it taught
them to make moral judgments.55 Melodramatic sensibilities spilled over into
mémoires judiciaires, the published trial briefs of some of the greatest causes célèbres
of the late Old Regime. As Sarah Maza has shown, these briefs, which became
50. Colin Jones, “The Great Chain of Buying: Medical Advertisement, the Bourgeois Public Sphere,
and the Origins of the French Revolution,” American Historical Review 101, no. 1 (1996): 25. For the surrep-
titious insertion of political commentary in late Old Regime book reviews, see Vivian R. Gruder, “Political
News as Coded Messages: The Parisian and Provincial Press in the Pre-revolution, 1787–1788,” French His-
tory 12, no. 1 (1998): 1–24.
51. Jones, “Great Chain of Buying,” 25. Jones cites a newssheet from 1777.
52. William H. Sewell, “Connecting Capitalism to the French Revolution: The Parisian Promenade and
the Origins of Civic Equality in Eighteenth-Century France,” Critical Historical Studies 1, no. 1 (2014): 27.
53. Ibid., 14.
54. Isabelle Martin, Le théâtre de la foire: des tréteaux aux boulevards (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2002);
Michèle Root-Bernstein, Boulevard Theater and Revolution in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI
Research Press, 1984). For the spread of theaters in the provinces and colonies in the latter half of the eigh-
teenth century, see Lauren Clay, Stagestruck: The Business of Theater in Eighteenth-Century France and Its Col-
onies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). For spectator demands for more entertaining playbills,
see Jeffrey S. Ravel, The Contested Parterre: Public Theater and French Political Culture, 1680–1791 (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
55. Sarah Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993), 61.
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bestsellers in the 1770s and 1780s, raised awareness of aristocratic despotism by
prompting citizen-readers to identify with the plight of ordinary victims. Lynn Hunt
locates the rise of civic empathy in epistolary novels, such as Samuel Richardson’s
Clarissa (1748) and Rousseau’s Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse (1762). Reading these
novels, she speculates, “had physical effects [emotional responses] that translated
into brain changes and came back out as new concepts about the organization of so-
cial and political life.”56 Human rights, she argues, were among the new concepts.
So, too, Iwould argue,was reciprocity—a termoften invoked in discussions of rights
and duties in the late eighteenth century.57
In spreading notions of civil equality and sentiments of civic solidarity, capital-
ism made reciprocity thinkable and emotionally compelling. But capitalism con-
tributed to reciprocity’s rise in still another way. In altering social relations, it stirred
up anxieties about the social order, prompting reﬂection on the nature of social
bonds and how to strengthen them. The erosion of status through commercialized
fashion was one source of anxiety, expressed in the much-studied debate over lux-
ury.58 But capitalism’s disruptive dynamics went deeper. In exacerbating wealth
inequality, social precariousness, and indebtedness, capitalism strained social rela-
tions. Theﬁrst twoof these problems—wealth inequality and social precariousness—
have been well documented.59 The latter problem—indebtedness—has recently be-
56. Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: Norton, 2006), 33.
57. I have identiﬁed no fewer than 60 eighteenth-century texts in which “réciprocité” appears in dis-
cussions of rights and duties. To take a prominent example, albeit in English: Thomas Paine defended the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 from criticism that it omitted duties by arguing,
“a Declaration of Rights is, by reciprocity, a Declaration of Duties;” in Rights of Man (1791; London: Penguin,
1985), 114.
58. Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue; Sarah Maza, “Luxury, Morality, and Social Change in Prerevo-
lutionary France,” Journal of Modern History 69, no. 2 (1997): 199–229; Colin Jones and Rebecca Spang,
“Sans-Culottes, Sans Café, Sans Tabac: Shifting Realms of Necessity and Luxury in Eighteenth-Century
France” in Consumers and Luxury: Consumer Culture in Europe, 1650–1850, ed. Maxine Berg and Helen Clifford
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 37–62; Jeremy Jennings, “The Debate About Luxury in
Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France,” Journal of the History of Ideas 68, no. 1 (January 2007): 79–
105.
59. For a synthesis of historical work on rising inequality and social precariousness in eighteenth-
century France, see Jean-Pierre Jesenne, “The Social and Economic Crisis in France at the End of the Ancien
Régime,” in A Companion to the French Revolution, ed. Peter McPhee (West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2013),
24–41; Jack A. Goldstone, “Demography,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Ancien Régime, ed. William Doyle
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 201–18. The transformation of communal bonds in Old Regime
France is discussed in David Garrioch, Neighborhood and Community in Paris, 1740–1790 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1986); for growing geographical mobility, see Daniel Roche, Humeurs vagabondes:
De la circulation des hommes et de l’utilité des voyages (Paris: Fayard, 2003). Throughout the eighteenth century,
the French countryside experienced low economic growth, much of which was either siphoned off in taxes
to pay for commercial wars or absorbed by a growing (and increasingly transient) population. Economic
growth was high in port cities, but the wealth did not penetrate into the interior (Paris excepted); see Philip
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gun attracting the attention of historians.60 Their studies show us a society shot
through with indebtedness, from the countryside to Versailles. The development
of commercial capitalism spurred the development of ﬁnancial capitalism, saddling
both the state and society with greater debts. Costly wars of commercial expansion,
especially the Seven Years’War (1756–63) and the AmericanWar of Independence
(1775–83), drove the regime to the brink of bankruptcy by the late 1780s. Yet, indi-
viduals were alsomired in debts as they came to rely increasingly on credit for neces-
sities (food, apprenticeships, dowries) and status items (luxuries, seigneuries, venal
ofﬁces, titles). Financial innovations of the periodmade loans easier to obtain but not
necessarily easier to service, especially during economic downturns.61
As debts grew, debtors tried to foist their burdens onto inferiors. The crown did so
by curtailing ﬁscal privileges and combing the countryside for taxes, often with
troops. The results were explosive: while elites cried despotism and mounted resis-
tance through the parlements (France’s sovereign courts), villagers increasingly re-
belled.62 To deal with their own ﬁnancial burdens, elites tried to squeeze more
wealth from their seigneuries. They reimposed long neglected feudal dues and con-
solidated their direct landholdings by seizing the parcels of increasingly insolvent
tenants.63 Periodic attempts to liberalize the grain trade (to increase agricultural pro-
T. Hoffman, Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450–1815 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1996).
60. Sonenscher, Before the Deluge; Fontaine, L’économie morale; Clare Haru Crowston, Credit, Fashion, Sex:
Economies of Regard in Old Regime France (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); David Stasavage, Pub-
lic Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688–1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003).
61. For ﬁnancial innovations, see Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal,
Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660–1870 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
62. Political struggles during the late Old Regime were largely about the crown’s efforts to impose taxes
on elites—a story well described by all general overviews of the Old Regime. For a concise synthesis, see
Gail Bossenga, “The Financial Origins of the French Revolution,” in From Deﬁcit to Deluge: The Origins of
the French Revolution, ed. Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2011), 37–66. For eighteenth-century successes in taxing privileged nobles, see Michael Kwass, Privilege
and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000). For rising rebelliousness in the late eighteenth century, see Jean Nicolas, La Rebellion
française: Mouvements populaires et conscience sociale (1661–1789) (Paris: Le Seuil, 2002).
63. For the consolidation of land tenures by wealthier peasants, who took over the tenures of insolvent
ones, and for the incorporation of peasant tenancies into landlord property, see Goldstone, “Demography,”
in The Oxford Handbook of the Ancien Régime, ed. William Doyle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 213;
for the shift from subsistence to speculative farming, the privatization of the commons, and large-scale
farming, see Peter Jones, “Agriculture,” in the same anthology, 244–46; see also P. M. Jones, The Peasantry
in the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 8, 31; and Anatoli Ado, Paysans en
Révolution: Terre, pouvoir et jacquerie, 1789–1794 (Paris: Société des Études robespierristes, 1996), 78–82. For
a chronologically broader discussion of peasant and elite indebtedness throughout the early modern pe-
riod, see Fontaine, L’économie morale, 48–100.
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ductivity and, consequently, tax revenues) made matters worse, polarizing commu-
nities, dividing authorities, and sparking acrimonious debate in the Republic of Let-
ters.64 Little wonder there was so much theorizing about social bonds in the latter
half of the eighteenth century. Those bonds were manifestly fraying.65
But how did reciprocity emerge as the perceived antidote to these ills? Because
philosophers did not explain their afﬁnity for the concept after 1750, the answer
requires some theorizing. A fruitful starting point is Kojin Karatani’s The Structure
of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange—a recent work of his-
torical philosophy that brings morality and economic exchange together into an
analysis of social orders.66 According to Karatani, at certain times in history, two
modes of exchange, each with its own social and moral logic, have come into sharp
tension with each other: redistribution and commodity exchange. Redistribution
involves procuring resources, usually through war and taxes, and selectively dis-
tributing them through hierarchies. In redistributive orders, politics and the eco-
nomic interests are intertwined in a culture of clientage and subjugation. Advance-
ment requires currying the favor of patrons. The commodity-exchange system
differs. Although it depends on the redistributive state, merchants prefer to operate
on the basis of consent, not subjugation. Commodity exchange favors property
rights and voluntary contracts betweenmoral and legal equals. Although commod-
ity exchange may appear to be more egalitarian, Karatani (drawing on Marx) ar-
gues that, in its global capitalist form, it produces hierarchies of wealth.67
Though historically interdependent (merchants have relied on the state’s money,
military, and courts), the redistributive state and global commerce pull in different
directions. From the standpoint of commodity exchange, the redistributive state
can appear obstructive, arbitrary, and corrupt. It unduly politicizes economic ex-
64. For free-market grain policies as an attempt to cope with regime debt, see Eugene Nelson White,
“Was There a Solution to the Ancien Regime’s Financial Dilemma?” Journal of Economic History 49, no. 3
(September 1989): 545–68. Increased taxation and speculation on future tax revenues outpaced increases
in agricultural productivity; see Hoffman, Growth in a Traditional Society. For polarization of authorities and
society over the liberalization of the grain trade, see Steven Laurence Kaplan, Bread, Politics, and Political
Economy in the Reign of Louis XV, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); Cynthia A. Bouton, The Flour
War: Gender, Class, and Community in Late Ancien Regime France (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity Press, 1993); Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 5.
65. Emma Rothschild argues that theories of “economic sentiments,” notably those of Adam Smith and
Marquis de Condorcet, were a response to the uncertainties and instabilities of the late eighteenth-century
commercial revolution; Economic Sentiments, 236–52.
66. Kojin Karatani, The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange, trans.
Michael K. Bourdaghs (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2014).
67. This is because in global capitalism, surplus value is derived through exchanges across different sys-
tems of value. Ibid., 182–208.
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change (better left to markets) and constrains property and trade. From the stand-
point of redistribution, commercial freedom produces selﬁshness, wealth imbal-
ances, and social fragmentation. Both modes of exchange produce hierarchies: in
redistribution, those hierarchies are based on status; in commodity exchange, they
are based on wealth. Karatani treats these modes of exchange as ideal types. He ac-
knowledges that they coexist in reality, albeit in different proportions at different
times—but proportions matter. His main point is that when global commerce comes
to predominate, as it did in the eighteenth century, it puts pressure on the redistrib-
utive state, creating conditions for a moral, social, and political crisis.
How does reciprocity ﬁt into all of this? Karatani argues that when the advocates
of global commerce begin seeing the redistributive state as a hindrance but alsowhen
anxieties about capitalism begin to rise, the friction between the two modes of ex-
change—between commerce and redistribution—sparks efforts to transcend both.
How? Through the revival of a repressed mode of exchange stretching back to clan
societies: reciprocity (gifts and countergifts among relative equals). This “return of
the repressed” (he draws on Sigmund Freud)68 recasts archaic reciprocity in a higher,
religious-like dimension. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the return of
repressed reciprocity took the forms of nationalism and socialism. The nation and
worker associations were seen as egalitarian spheres of reciprocity—as “imagined
communities” (he draws on Benedict Anderson)69 of exchange and solidarity among
equals. Patriotic self-sacriﬁce and mutualism represented moral alternatives to feu-
dal rent seeking and capitalist exploitation. Crucially, these forms of “reciprocity-in-
higher-dimension”70 exist in the imagination; social orders founded on them in-
evitably relapse into redistributive and commercial modes of exchange—until the
friction between the two builds again, reigniting the “reciprocal” imagination. The
modern era can be seen as an ongoing struggle between global capitalism and the re-
distributive state, with periodic surges of reciprocity in the forms of nationalism and
socialism.71
The Freudian element of Karatani’s theory—the return of repressed reciprocity
stretching back to early clan societies—can only be speculative, but it chimes with
the historical evidence. Eighteenth-century philosophers themselves looked to clan




71. Karatani worries that this modern cycle may be coming to an end because capitalism can no longer
count on unlimited labor and natural resources being fed into it from outside the system. Consequently,
“the world in which commodity exchange is predominant will regress to a world based on plunder and
violent appropriation carried out by the [redistributive] state.” Ibid., 284.
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they consist only of a kind of martial order and the law of reciprocity,” speculated
Rétif de la Bretonne, in a pithy formulation of a common conjecture.72 Political
economists often hypothesized about the nature of primitive societies in efforts to
establish the general law of reciprocity. True, they did so usually to justify commer-
cial capitalism, which may seem to contradict Karatani’s claim that they did so to
transcend it. But justifying commercial capitalism while trying to transcend its in-
iquities (or treating those iniquities as secondary and incidental) is possible within
his framework.
Karatani’s theory also accords with what we know about Old Regime France. It
is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd evidence of the friction between the redistributive state and
commercial capitalism in the recent historiography. It appears in studies of con-
temporary debates over the colonial exclusive, which pitted colonial free traders
againstmetropolitanmercantilists; over attempts to liberalize the grain trade, which
divided authorities and communities; over monopolistic trading companies, such as
the French Compagnie des Indes, which were chartered and suppressed repeatedly
across the century; over attempts to abolish the guilds and corporations, which
sparked protests and revolts; and over the liberal Anglo-French Commercial Treaty
of 1786, which, in opening up France to cheap British imports, nearly annihilated
France’s nascent manufacturing, provoking demands for subsidies and protec-
tions.73 What Karatani helps us see is how this friction sparked the reciprocal imag-
ination, and how reciprocity talk, in turn, fed into patriotic and eventually socialist
72. Nicolas-Edme Rétif de la Bretonne, Le Thesmographe, ou Idées d’un honnête homme sur un projet de
règlement proposé à toutes les nations de l’Europe pour opérer une réforme générale des loix; avec des notes historiques
(Paris: Maradan, 1789), 195. See also Anonymous, Les loix puisées chez les grecs, 1:154–55: “Man was the
only animal made for society, given his gift for conducting commerce with his fellowmen; . . . fear com-
pelled him to join with a small number [of others], and the aid he received subjected him to duties . . . ,
from which the reciprocity of resources was derived.” For the role of primitive societies in conjectural his-
tories of the Scottish Enlightenment, see H. M. Hopﬂ, “From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in
the Scottish Enlightenment,” Journal of British Studies 17, no. 2 (Spring 1978): 19–40.
73. For debates over the colonial exclusive, see Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce. Like Karatani, Cheney
sees the concept of “the nation” being mobilized on both sides of the colonial–metropolitan debate over
trade—the nation served efforts to transcend tensions between monopolies and commercial freedom.
For debates over the liberalization of the grain trade, see Kaplan, Bread, Politics, and Political Economy; Bou-
ton, Flour War; Judith A. Miller, Mastering the Market: The State and the Grain Trade in Northern France, 1700–
1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For debates over the attempt to suppress the guilds
and corporations in the 1770s and again in the 1790s, see Jean-Pierre Hirsch, Les deux rêves du commerce:
Entreprise et institution dans la région lilloise (1780–1860) (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales,
1991); Philippe Minard, La fortune du colbertisme: État et industrie dans la France des Lumières (Paris: Fayard,
1998). For debates over the state-sanctioned Compagnie des Indes, see Terjanian, Commerce and Its Discon-
tents, 137–81. For debates about the Franco-British Commercial Treaty of 1786, see Charles Walton, “The
Fall from Eden: The Free-Trade Origins of the French Revolution,” in The French Revolution in Global Perspec-
tive, ed. Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and WilliamMax Nelson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013),
44–56.
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discourses. What Karatani does not see, however, is that early reciprocity talk also
fed into discourses about commercial society—that reciprocity helped justify free-
market capitalism before becoming the latter’s “antithesis and alter ego” after the
French Revolution.
Karatani’s theory also helps us make sense of periodic surges of réciprocité
across the modern era. Google Ngram Viewer (ﬁg. A4) shows three frequency
spikes for the term (aside from the statistically insigniﬁcant spikes of the early eigh-
teenth century). The ﬁrst signiﬁcant spike occurred in the latter half of the eigh-
teenth century, the second between 1830 and 1848, and the third in the 1920s
and 1930s. The timing of these spikes is suggestive. They occurred when heady
free-market ideologies and advances in capitalism (commercial, industrial, and ﬁ-
nancial) met with heightened demands for social protections and wealth redistri-
bution, often in the throes of economic change and crisis. Reciprocity talk might
therefore represent a conceptual countermovement to free-market capitalism—a
way of imagining harmonious social relations in the face of widening wealth in-
equalities and disruptive socioeconomic change. The spikes also appear around
revolutionary moments: the late eighteenth-century commercial and democratic
revolutions, the industrial and political revolutions between 1830 and 1848, and
the reverberations of the Russian Revolution of 1917, which fed into socialist
and fascist movements, especially after the ﬁnancial crisis of 1929. Given this his-
torical pattern, one wonders whether the rise of reciprocity talk in anglophone
scholarship since the 1980s reﬂects a conceptual countermovement against neolib-
eral globalization. Karatani’s theory suggests that a resurgence of the reciprocal
imagination would ﬁnd expression in nationalist and socialist discourses—a phe-
nomenon we have witnessed since the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.
In sum, the history of the concept of reciprocity appears to be intertwined with
the history of capitalism. The advent of commercial and ﬁnancial capitalism in the
eighteenth century generated ideas, sentiments, and anxieties that made reciproc-
ity a compelling concept for reimagining social bonds. But beyond its premise of
moral equality and its connotations of sentimental solidarity, what did reciprocity
mean? What kinds of exchanges did it refer to? And how did it go from justifying
economic liberalism to becoming capitalism’s “antithesis and alter ego”?
BARTER AND THE GOLDEN RULE
In his Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle, Larousse deﬁned reciprocity in two ways.
On the one hand, it referred to the barter. “Reciprocity,” he explained, “is the ex-
change of goods and services on the basis of perfect, absolute equality.” This “natu-
ral” form of exchange differed from capitalism in its exclusion of proﬁt making. “In
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reciprocity, proﬁt cannot exist because exchanges occur at cost price.”74 But reci-
procitywas notmerely utilitarian; itwas also, he argued, an application of theGolden
Rule, “the well-known precept: do unto others as you would wish to be done to
you.” He observed, albeit with skepticism, that reciprocity was widely taken to be
synonymous with fraternity—those “charitable sentiments of altruism [that] dom-
inate the economy precisely because society is considered a family.” Fusing these
two understandings together (utility and altruism), he concluded that reciprocity
boiled down to the principle “to each according to his need.”
Larousse’s combining of barter and the Golden Rule into the concept of reci-
procity stretched back to the eighteenth century. It is discernible in some of the ear-
liest uses of the term. It reﬂects the effort to moralize economic productivity by con-
ﬂating it with generosity toward one’s fellow humans. In a treatise on education in
1762, written in anticipation of the Jesuits’ expulsion from France (and hence from
education), François de Paule Combalusier, chair of pathology at the University of
Valence, called for teaching children “that all men are brothers, that they are equal
by their nature, that they are essentially tied by the reciprocity of goods and ser-
vices, and that the greatest among them is the most charitable.”75 In juxtaposing
economic exchange and charity, Combalusier was no doubt trying to fuse them
in the minds of children. The two also overlapped in a posthumous treatise on
moral philosophy of 1754, penned by the outspoken critic of Jansenism and enemy
of the philosophes Abbé François Ilharat de La Chambre: “Whoever thinks that
men should be useful to each other but does not himself work for others’ happiness
is an outrageous imbecile. Such is the constitution of humanity: it consists of and
is maintained by the reciprocity of the same [degree of] assistance.”76 To produce
and exchange was to extend aid and assistance.
The question of whether aid and assistance (secours) sprang from sympathy or
self-interest—or a combination of the two—was a matter of much philosophical
speculation throughout the eighteenth century, from Mandeville to Condorcet,
passing by Rousseau, the physiocrats, and Smith.77 Reciprocity encompassed both
sides of this debate. It referred to self-interested exchanges (of “reciprocal utilities”)
and to civic generosity. But the two conceptions were not always given equal stress.
The physiocrats, seeking to liberalize the Old Regime’s economy, emphasized the
74. Larousse, Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siecle, 13:779.
75. François de Paule Combalusier,Mémoire de l’université sur les moyens de pouvoir à l’instruction de la jeu-
nesse et de la perfectionner (n.p., 1762), 6.
76. François Ilharat de La Chambre, Abrégé de la philosophie, ou Dissertations sur la certitude humaine, la
logique, la métaphysique, et la morale, 2 vols. (Paris: Joly de Fleury, Jean-Omer, 1754), 2:27.
77. Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
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former. “Nature’s aim is to link men together through bonds of reciprocal utility,”
insisted Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière, a popularizer of physiocracy, in his
L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés of 1767.78 For him, the moral framework for
economic exchange was not noble generosity or Christian charity but “rights and
duties.” Individuals had the natural right of private property, to exchange their
property as they pleased, but they also had the natural duty to be productive
and respect others’ property. It was in recognizing one’s duties and the advantages
for oneself of “staying united throughmutual aid”—by being economically produc-
tive—that “social bonds were tightened.”79
Although Le Mercier emphasized balance and utility, he left room in his philos-
ophy for generosity and obligation. To be productive was at once a generous act
and the fulﬁllment of an obligation not to particular individuals but to society as
a whole: “It is to society that we are indebted.”80 Still, at every turn in the argu-
ment, LeMercier pressed generosity and obligation into a balanced system of utility
and rational self-interest. His understanding of the parent-child relationship exem-
pliﬁes this tendency. Although nature may have instilled caring sentiments in par-
ents, the carrying out of parental duties was also achieved “by the contemplation of
the need mothers and fathers will have one day for the aid of their children.”81
Reciprocity runs throughout Le Mercier’s L’ordre naturel. All the fundamental
aspects of social relations—rights, duties, exchange—adhere to this principle. Bal-
ance and moral equality appear everywhere; hierarchy and caste simply do not en-
ter the frame. Le Mercier did not, however, deny the existence of inequalities. But
like other philosophers at the time, he secondarized them, attributing them to ac-
cidents of nature about which little could or should be done: “the inequality of con-
ditions is the necessary consequence of natural inequalities [of strengths, talents,
etc.]; and even if inequality is a factor behind social disorders, it should not be abol-
ished since doing so would require abolishing [private] property, and, hence, soci-
ety itself.”82
Other writers invoking reciprocity stressed generosity and obligation over self-
interest and exchange equivalence. In his whimsical Les nuits de Paris in 1789, the
irreverent observer of urban life, Rétif de la Bretonne, offered what is the only sus-
tained meditation on the concept I have found for the eighteenth century. In a
78. Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière, L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques (London: Chez
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chapter titled “Réciprocité,” he postulated, “We have given the people and even
our sages only one basis for morality, but it is extremely solid: reciprocity.”83 An-
ticipating notions of fraternity thatwould soon sweep across the country, he equated
reciprocity with the Golden Rule. “Unless one is crazy, one cannot reject this grand
and beautiful truth: DO UNTO OTHERS AS YOU WISH THEY DO UNTO YOU.”84
Unlike barter, Rétif’s reciprocity involved giving without necessarily receiving, or
at least not immediately. The return might come indirectly, at a later time, or not
at all. One’s descendants might reap the beneﬁts of one’s generosity today, although
to the degree one identiﬁed with one’s progeny or the future of one’s society, this
could be considered recompense.85 “Society”was central in all this because the bal-
ancing of accounts took place there, rather than through discreet exchanges between
individuals. Still, just as Le Mercier had left space for generosity and obligation in
his otherwise utilitarian schema, Rétif left room in his for rational self-interest.
The chief beneﬁts of reciprocity for the individual, he explained, were the avoidance
of violence and the possibility of inspiring a return: “The entire science of morality
can be reduced to behaving in such a manner that, not only will others not seek
vengeance against us; they may also become fair through our example and even
benevolent towards us, in consideration of our universal philanthropy.”86
Reciprocity was thus morally elastic. It referred to self-interest and selﬂessness—
to barter and generosity. This constructive ambiguity opened up all sorts of possible
arguments. It helped the abbé Dorihac, during the ﬁnancial crisis of 1788, turn a
Gospel injunction to be generous into a justiﬁcation for demanding interest on loans.
The passage he cited (Luke 6:34) is hardly ambiguous: “Love your enemies . . . lend
to them, expecting nothing in return.”87 But Dorihac insisted that the passage re-
ferred to “the reciprocity of the loan” and not a free gift.88 His notion of reciprocity
oscillated between generosity (“the sacriﬁce ofmy possession in your favor”) and ex-
change equivalence: “there is a reciprocity of advantages [in the loan]; I am therefore
not unjust in demanding revenues on the capital [i.e., interest] that I lend to you . . .
83. Nicolas-Edme Rétif de la Bretonne, Les nuits de Paris, ou l'observateur nocturne, 8 tomes in 16 parts
(London: n.p., 1789), 2:3:512.
84. Ibid., original capitals.
85. Ibid., 514.
86. Ibid., 524–25. The same argument was made in a dialogue on civic morality during the Revolution;
see le Citoyen Bulard, Almanach d’Aristide ou Du vertueux républicain pour l’an III de la République (Paris: Chez
Caillot, an III [1794–95]), 73: “A Citizen: I believe it in our interest to be benevolent. Aristide: In doing so
with others, we have the right to expect an equivalent return. Our generosity is an act that provokes rec-
iprocity.”
87. Abbé Dorihac, Traité de la légitimité du prêt lucrative, ouvrage utile et instructif, pour les laïques et pour les
ecclésiastiques (London: 1788), 155–57.
88. Ibid., 155.
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they are the price of my service, which I am under no obligation to render.”89 His
reasoning may strike us as specious, but given reciprocity’s ambiguous meanings,
it may have convinced some readers. It certainly would have found sympathizers
among the state’s creditors, including the Church, which risked seeing the crown
slash interest rates on existing loans. Indeed, the stakes of Dorihac’s argument were
hardly hypothetical.90
Though often conﬂated, barter and the Golden Rule were distinct propositions,
more easily reconciled in the abstract than in practice. Giving unto others some-
thing equivalent to what they give unto you differs from giving unto others as
you wish they would give unto you. In the ﬁrst, equivalence is a precondition
for the exchange; in the second, it is not—obligation takes its place. But in spanning
both views, reciprocity accommodated liberal and social understandings of society.
Much ink would be spilled in the modern era trying to clarify the matter. Was rec-
iprocity (and its synonym, fraternity) about rational self-interest or civic selﬂess-
ness? Did it refer to utilitarian barter or to the existential obligation to be kind to
others?
Both conceptions of reciprocity had origins in Old Regime culture. Again, Ka-
ratani helps us to see how. He argues that the return of “reciprocity-in-higher-
dimension”—that idealistic mode of exchange—depends on the presence of the
modes of exchange it seeks to transcend: redistribution and commodity exchange.91
I would add that the concept of reciprocity retained some of the morality of those
two modes and oscillated between them. On the one hand, it expressed a secular,
egalitarian reworking of Christian charity and noble generosity, principles deeply
rooted in early modern redistributive culture. On the other, it referred to balanced
utilitarian exchanges between moral equals—the essence of doux commerce. En-
lightenment philosophers may have been persuasive in combining the two on the
page, obscuring asymmetrical proﬁt making in the process. But when the Old Re-
gime collapsed, the moral tensions among all three exchange propositions—gen-
erosity, barter, and proﬁt—would tear revolutionaries apart.
THE RISE AND FALL OF FREE-MARKET FRATERNITY
In retrospect, it seems odd that economic liberalism was ever justiﬁed in terms of
reciprocity. Reciprocity implies balance; capitalism seeks proﬁts. But it was pre-
cisely reciprocity’s connotation of balance that made it an effective weapon against
89. Ibid., 53–54.
90. For the Church’s loans to the regime, see Louis S. Greenbaum, Talleyrand: Statesman-Priest (Wash-
ington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1970), 38–39. I would like to thankWilliamDoyle for this
reference.
91. Karatani, Structure of World History, xii, 9–10, 307.
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caste and privilege. Projected onto commercial society, reciprocity offered a moral
alternative to feudalism and mercantilism. The political economist and barrister
from Orléans Guillaume-François Le Trône deployed the concept in this manner.
A leading contributor to physiocratic publications in the 1760s and 1770s, Le Trône
championed the cause of free trade, even of grain (a sensitive commodity), in the
name of reciprocity. As early as 1764, he assured readers that “the reciprocity of
Commerce will gradually unite us with other Peoples.”92 If France sold its grain
to other countries in their time of need, then “by the immutable Laws of human-
ity,” they would reciprocate when hard times fell upon France. Free trade would
lead to mutual assistance and happiness.
In making reciprocity the measure of social relations, Le Trône was able to ex-
pose the inherent injustices of feudalism. In a tract of 1779, expanded and repub-
lished posthumously in 1788 and cited by several authors in 1789, he urged readers
to assess feudalism in the light of reciprocity. “To get a clear understanding of feu-
dalism, the right point of view is perhaps to see it from the perspective of reciproc-
ity, which shows [feudal] property to be ﬁctive, leaving nothing that is real except
fees, pains, and embarrassments.”93 Feudalism involved multiple claims on prop-
erty that enriched those at the top at the expense of those at the bottom. Everyone
in between, at best, broke even, passing revenues extracted from below upward.
More often they incurred losses through administrative and legal fees. The chief
beneﬁciaries of this vexatious system were the dues collectors, feudal consultants,
notaries, and lawyers. Ultimately, “feudal property is not only null in terms of rec-
iprocity; it is onerous, very onerous.”94
Even in exposing feudalism’s inherent asymmetries, liberal economic notions of
reciprocity obscured those inherent in commercial capitalism. In part, this obfusca-
tion may have reﬂected the priorities of the age. In his study of eighteenth-century
accounting practices, Pierre Gervais shows that merchants were less concerned
about calculating proﬁts and losses than they were about tracking credit ﬂows.95
92. Guillaume-François Le Trosne [Trône], Discours sur l’état actuel de la magistrature, et sur les causes de sa
décadence: Prononcé à l’ouverture des audiences du bailliage d’Orléans, le 15 novembre 1763, par M. Le Trosne, avocat
du Roi (Paris: Chez Panckoucke, 1764), 76.
93. Le Trône, De l’administration provinciale, 2:476. Le Trône was cited as an authority in at least two
tracts in 1789: Jacques-Antoine Boudin, Nouvelles réﬂexions sur le rachat des droits féodaux (Paris: Chez
Desenne, 1789), 19; and Anonymous, De la Féodalité et de l’Aristocratie française: ou Tableau des effets désastreux
des Droits féodaux; et Réfustation des erreurs sur lesquelles la Noblesse fonde ses prétentions (n.p., 1789), 18.
94. Le Trône, De l’administration provinciale, 2:477.
95. Pierre Gervais, “Why Proﬁt and Loss Didn’t Matter: The Historicized Rationality of Early Modern
Accounting,”Merchants and Proﬁt in the Age of Commerce, 1680–1830, ed. Pierre Gervais, Yannick Lemarchand,
and Dominique Margairaz (Cambridge: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 33–52.
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But proﬁt making was also obscured by a tendency to present commercial ex-
changes as necessarily win-win relationships. Merchants might enrich themselves
in the process, but society and “the nation”were the ultimate beneﬁciaries. “All are
rich through the reciprocity of needs and the reciprocal utilities of exchange,” de-
clared Forbonnais in his full-throated praise of commerce.96 Although Adam Smith
did not invoke “reciprocity” in The Wealth of Nations (the English term was just be-
ginning to percolate in the 1770s, see ﬁg. A6), the book’s full title also implied that
trade’s beneﬁts were collective. The study was, after all, “an inquiry into the nature
and causes of the wealth of nations,” not of merchants. Smith, in fact, held a dim
view of merchants.97 Left to their own devices, they sought protections and subsi-
dies and formed monopolies and combinations. These ills could be prevented only
by the state, which, in establishing a competitive framework for commerce, would
ensure that commercial gains would be enjoyed collectively.
The heyday of liberal economic conceptions of reciprocity came in the 1780s.
Optimism about the reciprocal beneﬁts of free trade, already expressed by the
physiocrats in the 1760s and 1770s, pervaded the Peace of Paris meetings of
1783.98 The Correspondance secrète, which conveyed the opinions and gossip circu-
lating in Parisian high society, summed up the reigning view about the commercial
negotiations: “Freedom of trade and navigation across all seas will destroy a great
many pretentions that might disrupt peace in Europe, since any [pretentions] that
do not give rise to reciprocity will no longer exist. . . . Balance will be established by
bringing advantages to all peoples without any detriments; all will beneﬁt.”99 After
some foot dragging and false starts, Britain and France ﬁnally concluded a liberal
trade deal in 1786. Its adverse impact was immediately felt by France’s ﬂedgling
manufacturing sector, which was nearly wiped out by a tsunami of cheap British
goods. Defending the treaty from widespread criticism, one French writer insisted
that its core principle of reciprocity ensured that mutual beneﬁts would prevail in
the long run: “This treaty will endure forever and, THANKS TO THE NATURE OF THINGS,
96. Forbonnais, Principes et observationsœconomiques (1767), 1:9. For a concise overviewof this eighteenth-
century viewof commerce, seeOlivierGrenouilleau,Et le marché devint roi (Paris: Flammarion, 2013), chap. 5.
97. Nathan Rosenberg, “Adam Smith on Proﬁts—Paradox Lost and Regained,” Journal of Economic His-
tory 82, no. 6 (1974): 1177–90.
98. Le Trône, De l’administration provinciale, 1:56 n. 1. Le Trône saw free trade as “based on the reciproc-
ity that justice prescribes to men and societies.”
99. Entry for April 12, 1783, in Correspondance secrète, politique & littéraire, ou mémoires pour servir à
l’histoire des cours, des sociétés & de la littérature en France, depuis la mort de Louis XV, 18 vols. (London: Chez
John Adamson, 1787–1790), vol. 14.
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will be greatly beneﬁcial to both nations . . . since it is based on the infallible prin-
ciple—a reciprocity of advantages.”100
Despite the hype, doubts about free trade’s reciprocal beneﬁts grew. Some saw
reciprocity not as the natural effect of free trade but as a means of tempering free
trade’s imbalances. The shift was subtle at ﬁrst but would accelerate after 1789. In
conﬁdential comments written on the British draft of a commercial treaty in 1786,
Charles-Alexandre de Calonne, controller general of ﬁnances and outspoken sup-
porter of free trade, conceded, “Liberty is without doubt the spirit of commerce,
and we are disposed to extend it as far as possible. . . . But,” he added, “this freedom
is merely an abstraction without reciprocity: it is essentially this reciprocity that we
must establish.”101 Achieving reciprocity, in other words, necessitated industry-by-
industrybargaining, not total abandon to free-market forces. Someon theBritish side,
sharing these doubts, rejected the free-trade and reciprocity rhetoric altogether. In
a letter to the British negotiator in Paris (William Eden), the Earl of Shefﬁeld wrote,
“When men talk of liberality and reciprocity in commercial matters, it is clear either
that they have no argument or no knowledge of the subject . . . it is not friendship
or favour, but exactness and punctuality, that is looked for in commerce.”102
Because of the outbreak of a court scandal (the Diamond Necklace Affair), the
French crown, compromised and desperate for an achievement, caved to British
demands for liberal trade. Its achievement looked like a failure once it became clear
that the treaty favored Britain. Despite complaints and dissatisfaction, France up-
held the treaty, more for geopolitical than economic reasons, until war broke out
with Britain in 1793.103 Over the course of the agreement, misgivings about liber-
alized trade set in. Perhaps market freedomwould not ensure reciprocity’s promise
of peace, balance, and mutual prosperity after all. For Pierre-Louis Goudard, a na-
tional deputy in 1790 and architect of far-reaching domestic economic reforms a
year later, it was naïve to believe that reciprocity could be attained through free
trade. The advantages and disadvantages of free trade were never evenly distrib-
uted, and countries would never honor such agreements if doing so undermined
100. Charles, le marquis de Casaux, Quatrième suite des considérations sur quelques parties du méchanisme
des sociétés (London: T. Spilsbury. Se trouve chez P. Elmsley, 1788), vii. For France’s trade deﬁcit with Brit-
ain between 1784 and 1788, see John Ehrman, The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Eu-
rope, 1783–1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 194n, 220–21.
101. “Observations à communiquer conﬁdentiellement à M. Eden sur son projet de Traité,” Auckland
Papers, British Library, carton 34421, fol. 101.
102. John Holroyd, Earl of Shefﬁeld, Observations on the Commerce of the American States (London:
Debrett, 1783), 111.
103. For balance-of-trade statistics showing Britain’s advantage at France’s expense and for France’s
geopolitical motivations for maintaining the agreement, see Walton, “Fall from Eden,” 52, 55.
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their interests.104 The historian and elected member of the Academy of Moral and
Political Sciences during the Directory, Louis-Pierre Anquetil, expressed similar
skepticism ﬁve years later. He concluded his history of Bourbon wars with a cri-
tique of the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786, advising that France avoid
making such treaties in the future. By doing so, “we will no longer expose our-
selves to being surprised by the unbalanced [trade] conditions that are presented
under the guise of an equitable reciprocity.”105 At least one political economist
of the late 1790s doubted whether equity and mutual beneﬁts had any relation to
commerce at all. Antoine Français de Nantes, a former Jacobin and now democratic-
republican deputy in the Council of Five Hundred, saw commerce as inherently
unreciprocal: “However democratic onemay be, onemust admit that, while equality
is essential for representative government, inequality is both the cause and conse-
quence of commerce.”106
Reciprocity’s gradual disappearance from justiﬁcations for commercial freedom
during the Revolution is perceptible in debates over the domestic economy as well.
In 1789, optimism about reciprocity and commercial freedom was still in the air,
and it penetrated the National Assembly. It crystallized in a decree on August 29,
liberalizing the grain trade. The text of the decree was drenched in notions of fra-
ternal sentimentality. It called upon “all Frenchmen to regard each other as true
brothers, always disposed to give each other all kinds of reciprocal assistance.”107
But “reciprocal assistance” referred to the free market. Anyone suspected of inter-
vening in it—be they individuals, crowds, or ofﬁcials—was to be charged with the
high crime of lèse-nation, a kind of sedition.
104. Pierre-LouisGoudard,Rapport fait à l’Assemblée nationale, au nom duComité du commerce et d’agriculture,
sur la suppression des droits de traite perçus dans l’intérieur du royaume, le reculement des douanes aux frontières,
et l’établissement d’un tarif uniforme (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1790), 20.
105. Louis-Pierre Anquetil, Motifs des guerres et des traités de paix de la France pendant règnes de Louis XIV,
Louis XV et Louis XVI, depuis la paix de Westphalie, en 1648, jusqu’à celle de Versailles, en 1783 (Paris: Lesguilliez
frères, 1797), 380. Others also questioned the treaty’s “reciprocal” beneﬁts: “The experience of [the treaty]
has convinced us, to our detriment, that the apparent reciprocity of the commercial treaty of Versailles is
entirely null for France and favors, in the ﬁnal analysis, only England.” Jules Gautier, Essai sur la restauration
des ﬁnances de la France et sur l’organisation générale et administrative de l’agriculture et du commerce . . . (Marseille:
Imprimerie de Bertrand, 1799), 161.
106. Antoine Français de Nantes, Coup-d’œil rapide sur les mœurs, les lois, les contributions, les secours publics,
les sociétés politiques, les cultes, les théâtres, les institutions publiques, dans leurs rapports avec le gouvernement
représentatif et sur tous les moyens propres à affermir la constitution de l’an III (Grenoble: P. Cadou et David aîné,
1795–96 [year 4]), 7. I would like to thank Minchul Kim for sharing his work on Français de Nantes with
me.
107. Jérôme Mavidal and Émile Laurent, eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Recueil complet des
débats législatifs et politiques des Chambres françaises, 82 vols. (Paris: P. Dupont, 1867), 8:510–11.
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The National Assembly’s early free-market policies divided revolutionaries.
Some remained committed to the belief in their mutual, long-term beneﬁts. Speak-
ing on behalf of the wholesale merchant community, Joseph-Jean-Chistostôme
Farcot insisted in 1791 that free markets would bring about not only national pros-
perity but also world peace. Countries adopting free trade, he reasoned, would in-
spire others to imitate them. Through “a reciprocity of beneﬁts,” free trade would
bring about “a reciprocity of liberty” and “a general peace among all the peoples of
the world.”108 But others were less sanguine, especially those worried about sub-
sistence. In 1791, the General Council of the Paris Commune expressed its con-
cerns about “the [current] laws that protect the free circulation of [grain] in the
kingdom . . . It is uncertain that commerce alone . . . can ensure the provisioning
of Paris.”109
Even some advocates of commercial freedom began acknowledging that free
markets might not protect foodstuffs from speculation and that a different kind
of reciprocity—that of obligation rather than market forces—might be needed. In
late 1792, as France slid deeper into chaos and grain became scarce, a deputy from
Marseilles, Charles Jean Marie Barbaroux, called for a middle course between ab-
solute property rights and market freedom on the one hand and price ceilings and
requisitioning on the other. He proposed allowing merchants to oblige fellow mer-
chants to sell them half their grain at cost. In distributing grain supplies more widely,
the policy would discourage hoarding and lower prices. It would not violate prop-
erty because it was based on “a reciprocity of rights: . . . what a merchant gives one
day might be returned the next.”110 This was reciprocity in its generous, Golden
Rule rather than liberal economic mode. Antoine François Bertrand de Molleville,
minister of the Navy and of the Colonies between 1790 and 1792, espoused a sim-
ilar notion of reciprocity—one that placed it in its generosity-obligation rather free-
market register. To rescue the economically devastated colony of Saint Domingue
in 1791, he urged metropolitan merchants, who had proﬁted so much from the
slave colony in the past, to freely give—and not just lend—to the colony in its hour
of need. “This reciprocity of exchanges and wealth, so advantageous for France,
108. Joseph-Jean-Chisostôme Farcot, Questions constitutionnelles sur le commerce et l’industrie et projet d’un
impôt direct sur les commerçans et gens à l’industrie . . . proposés à l’Assemblée nationale par des négociants français
(Paris: Chez Le Clère, 1790), 131–32.
109. Extrait des registres des délibérations du conseil générale de la Commune de Paris in Jacques Peuchet, Ju-
risprudence: contenant la police et les municipalités, 10 vols. (Paris: Panckoucke, 1791), 10:791.
110. Opinion de Charles Barbaroux, de Marseille, député par le département des Bouches-du-Rhône, à la Conven-
tion nationale, sur les causes de la cherté des grains et les moyens d’y remédier (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 179-),
18–19.
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obliges us in this moment to repair the damage suffered by these rich establish-
ments.”111
The free-market policies of the early Revolution gave way to price controls and
requisitioning during the Terror (1793–94). As France became embroiled in civil
and foreign wars, reciprocity and its synonym, fraternity, remained squarely in the
generosity and obligation register. Pieties about the reciprocal beneﬁts of self-interest
and free markets were not aired, at least not openly. When economic liberalism
was revived during the Directory, reciprocity scarcely ﬁgured in justiﬁcations for
it. The term appeared mostly in discussions of matters other than commerce, such
as state-society relations, social contracts, and the need for mutual esteem among
citizens. The few tracts that did link reciprocity to commercial freedom were re-
editions of earlier works. The 1796 edition of Forbonnais’s midcentury Élements du
commerce (larded, aswehave seen,withmore instances of “réciprocité” than the orig-
inal) was an exception. In general, the concept became detached from liberal eco-
nomic theory. Along with its synonym fraternité, réciprocité frowned on economic
egoism—a disposition expressed in full force during the Terror. (It appeared in an in-
scription mounted on a guillotine in the town of Moulin: “Aristocrats, the rich, ego-
ists, and starvers of the people, tremble!”112) This social, as opposed to liberal, dispo-
sition clung to the term into the nineteenth century. It shows through in the entry for
“réciprocité” in Dictionnaire universel de la langue française of 1835: “The social order
is a vast system of exchanges, sacriﬁces and reciprocities. The egoist who gives noth-
ing has the right to nothing. He disturbs the social order. He destroys it.”113
The Terror phase of the Revolution thus appears to have brought an end to the
early Revolution’s free-market fraternity rhetoric, itself a product of Enlighten-
ment theories of commercial society. Fraternity acquired reciprocity’s Golden Rule
associations, as a dictionary of neologisms in 1795 made clear: “Fraternity is the
cradle of civil society . . . it commands men to do unto others what you would wish
to have done unto you.”114
111. Antoine-François, marquis de Bertrand de Molleville, Mémoires secrets pour servir à l’histoire de la
dernière année du règne de Louis XVI, 3 vols. (London: Strahan & Cadell, 1797), 1:311.
112. Pierre Caron, ed., Rapports des Agents du Ministre de l’Intérieur dans les Départements (1793—an 2),
2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1913), 1:465.
113. Pierre Claude Victoire Boiste and Charles Nodier, Dictionnaire universel de la langue française, avec le
latin et les étymologies . . . , 8th ed. (Brussels: Méline, 1835).
114. Léonard Snetlage, Nouveau dictionnaire français contenant les expressions de nouvelle création du peuple
français: ouvrage additionel au dictionnaire de l’Académie française et à tout autre vocabulaire (Göttingen: J. C.
Dieterich, 1795), 98–99; emphasis in original.
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BECOMING CAPITALISM ’S ANTITHESIS AND ALTER EGO
As invocations of reciprocity skyrocketed in the nineteenth century (see ﬁgs. A4
and A5), the concept came to be seen as the antithesis of free-market capitalism.
This view is discernible in three domains: international trade, political philosophy,
and the social sciences.
In international relations in the nineteenth century, free trade and reciprocity
were no longer seen as mutually reinforcing principles. They were stark alterna-
tives. “Hurrah for Free Trade; down with Reciprocity!” wrote an author in 1870,
voicing his liberal sympathies on the matter.115 A decade later, Samuel Smith of-
fered a lengthy discussion of this debate in his seminal and much cited Free Trade
versus Reciprocity.116 Even those who believed free trade and reciprocity were one
and the same acknowledged that they were challenging conventional views.117
The debate stretched back at least to the 1840s, when reciprocity became the battle
cry of the fair-trade movement, which opposed the liberal doctrines coming from
Britain.118 “Without reciprocity,” the Germans insisted in their negotiations with
Britain, “free-trade does absolute harm to the state which ‘generously’ sacriﬁces
everything to its principles.”119 As Calonne had realized in his dealings with Britain
in the 1780s, reciprocity would require active bargaining to achieve a balance of
beneﬁts, not passive submission to market forces. For their part, the advocates of
free trade dismissed their fair-trade opponents as “reciprocity-mongers,” a term
that gained enough currency to merit an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary.120
115. Commercial Treaties: Free Trade and Internationalism. Four Letters (London: Macmillan, 1870), 25.
116. Samuel Smith, Free Trade versus Reciprocity (1881; Miami: HardPress, 2014).
117. The anonymous author of Reciprocity, by a Manufacturer (Leeds: Baines & Newsome, 1844) refuted
the common distinction made between free trade and reciprocity, arguing, “In trade, a man cannot beneﬁt
himself without to a certain extent beneﬁting others . . . all classes aid, willingly or unwillingly, in supplying
the wants of the people. . . . Here is manifest the true spirit of reciprocity, which constitutes a portion of our
nature, and, like the physical growth of the human frame, requires only full scope [i.e., free trade] to de-
velop itself” (46). Another writer (a “Disciple of Richard Cobden”) concluded, “Instead of ﬁnding the idea
of reciprocity arrayed in opposition to the idea of free trade, we ﬁnd the two to be inseparable compan-
ions.” Commercial Treaties, 27.
118. For recent historical treatments of these debates in Britain, see Douglas A. Irwin, “The Reciprocity
Debate in Parliament, 1842–1846,” in Free Trade and Its Reception, 1815–1960, ed. Andrew Marrison (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1998), 129–46; Peter T. Marsh, Bargaining on Europe: Britain and the First Common Market,
1860–1892 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 110. With its vast empire and superior trade vol-
ume, Britain stood to beneﬁt from free trade.
119. Cited in Marsh, Bargaining on Europe, 110.
120. The OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; www.oed.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac
.uk/view/Entry/159546?redirectedFrom5reciprocity), dates “reciprocity-monger” to the latter half of the
nineteenth century. In his book about democracy, the British historian and free-trade supporter Arthur
Crump insisted that “reciprocity-mongers”would never “fail to disturb the convictions of the sound think-
ers, whose faith in Free Trade principles cannot be shaken”; A Short Inquiry into the Formation of Political
Opinions from the Reign of the Great Families to the Advent of Democracy (London: Longmans, Green, 1885), 198.
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While diplomats and economists wrangled over the terms of international trade,
philosophers and social scientists developed reciprocity into an ethical norm and
heuristic concept. Here, too, it stood opposed to free-market capitalism. In that
lengthy deﬁnition of reciprocity in Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle (discussed ear-
lier), Larousse observed that the principle informedmany of the social contract the-
ories of the day. Based on those theories, he predicted that reciprocity would bring
an end to capitalism: “With every day [reciprocity] tends to replace antagonisms,
which, until now, have been considered necessary to social organization, produc-
ing distinctions, class hierarchies, and competition among individuals.”121 Unlike
capitalism, reciprocity necessitated equality: “As long as men are not considered
equal . . . reciprocity can be neither imagined nor practiced, since its fundamental
principle is equality of rights, functions, responsibilities, and relations.”122 For all
his misgivings about capitalism, Larousse did not consider communism and social-
ism viable alternatives. Communist states were too unwieldy tomanage supply and
demand efﬁciently; socialism was too utopian in believing that competition could
be suppressed.
Despite his rejection of socialism, Larousse echoed the views of the socialist-
anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, including Proudhon’s critique of the common
conﬂation of fraternity and reciprocity. In his Idée générale de la Révolution au XIXe siè-
cle, published on the eve of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte’s overthrow of the Second
Republic in 1851, Proudhon wrote that, although he admired the “fraternal senti-
ments” of the Parisian worker associations, which were establishing barter networks,
he did not think that such sentiments were sufﬁcient for establishing a new social
order. (Incidentally, one of the worker associations he discussed was named La
Réciprocité.) Proudhon distinguished between “charitable sentiments” and reciproc-
ity. The latter, he explained, “consists in sellers and buyers guaranteeing each other,
irrevocably, their products at cost price.”123 Adopting a materialist view, he believed
that reciprocity was ultimately achieved through exchange practices based on con-
tract; fraternal sentiments were the result, not the source, of those practices.124
It is ironic that Proudhon’s socialist thinking had much in common with that of
economic liberals of the Enlightenment. Like them, he described reciprocity in terms
of barter and, on that basis, sought to legitimize a new social order. Like them,
121. Larousse, Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle, 13:779.
122. Ibid.
123. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, trans. John Beverly
Robinson (1851; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003), 91.
124. Ibid., 90: “What would become of them [worker associations] if they did not ﬁnd the guarantee of
their enterprise elsewhere than in the charity [i.e., fraternity] which animates them and which is but the
cement of the ediﬁce, whereof the stones are labor and the forces which multiply labor?”
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he combined the reciprocity of goods and services with the reciprocity of rights
and duties—a “conﬂation” of economic and political principles for which the econ-
omist Léon Walras would later criticize him.125 And like the physiocrats, Proudhon
understood reciprocity to consist of balanced exchanges that, over time, strength-
ened social and sentimental bonds.
So perhaps Alexis de Tocqueville was right when he observed in The Old Regime
and the French Revolution (1856): “It is commonly thought that the subversive the-
ories of what today is known as socialism are of recent origin. This is not so; views
of this kind were sponsored by the earliest Economists [the physiocrats].”126 Of
course, there were a great many differences as well. Whereas the physiocrats
had invoked reciprocity to discredit privileges and monopolies, Proudhon invoked
it to discredit proﬁt and private property. And whereas the physiocrats had ob-
scured the wealth inequalities produced by capitalism, Proudhon saw such in-
equalities as capitalism’s very essence.
In the early twentieth century, reciprocity entered anthropology. So, too, did its
conceptual tensions between self-interest and generosity and between barter and
the Golden Rule. Bronislaw Malinowski spent years meticulously classifying the ex-
change practices of archaic societies according to the motives of interestedness and
disinterestedness—an undertaking that Marcel Mauss found deeply misguided.127
In his seminal The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (1925),
Mauss argued that these conceptual oppositions—self-interest versus selﬂessness,
Homo economicus versus altruism—were recent inventions, the products of modern
law and economics.128 He deconstructed them by showing how they were inter-
twined in archaic societies. What moderns took to be stark alternatives were, in
the “melting pot” of archaic societies, all “jumbled up together.” In this jumble,
Mauss thought to have “discovered one of the bases of [all] social life.” Even in cap-
italist societies, he believed, generosity and obligation (i.e., the gift) persisted, “hid-
den, below the surface.”129 By revealing how utilitarian self-interest and the gift op-
125. Léon Walras, L’économie politique et la justice: Examen critique et réfutation des doctrines économiques de
M. J.-P. Proudhon, précédés d’une introduction à l’étude de la question sociale (Paris: Librairie de Guillaumin et
Cie., 1860), 63–65.
126. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Régime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York:
First Anchor, 1955), 163. It is worth noting, however, that de Tocqueville erred in presenting the obscure
Enlightenment philosopher Étienne-Gabriel Morelly as a physiocrat. Morelly opposed many of the funda-
mental principles of the Gournay Circle and physiocrats; see the editor’s introduction to Étienne-Gabriel
Morelly, Code de la nature: Édition critique, ed. Stéphanie Roza (n.p.: Éditions qui brûle, 2011).
127. Mauss, The Gift, 93.
128. Ibid., 91–100. For a penetrating discussion of this aspect of The Gift, see Jonathan Parry, “The Gift,
the Indian Gift and the ‘Indian Gift,’” Man, n.s., 21, no. 3 (September 1986): 453–73, esp. 457.
129. Mauss, The Gift, 5.
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erate together in modern society (he gave several examples at the end of the essay),
he hoped to “throw a light on the path that our nations must follow, both in their
morality and their economy.”130
Mauss’s deconstruction of these dichotomies—self-interest and selﬂessness,
freedom and obligation, barter and gift—amounted to a deconstruction of reciprocity
itself. As I have argued, these dichotomies, or tensions, have been present in the phil-
osophical concept since its birth in the eighteenth century. But Mauss’s essay did not
put them to rest. Social scientists and philosophers have continued grappling with
them ever since. In his Stone Age Economics (1974), Marshall Sahlins proposed a clas-
siﬁcation scheme that distinguished between “balanced reciprocity” (even exchange)
and “generalized reciprocity” (the Golden Rule, gift and obligation).131 In Le don des
philosophes: Repenser la réciprocité (2012), the philosopher and anthropologist Marcel
Hénaff showed how these tensions reverberate in the gift theories of Jacques Derrida,
Emmanuel Levinas, and Paul Ricoeur.132 He aimed to resolve them by distinguishing
market and ritual forms of reciprocity—a crucial distinction, he believes, that these
philosophers overlooked. Ritual reciprocity, he explained, concerns honor and mu-
tual recognition, not utilitarian exchanges. Yet, as we have seen, honor and mutual
recognition were at stake in reciprocity’s earliest uses in post-Westphalian commer-
cial treaties, well before utility and trade balances were brought to bear on the term
during the Enlightenment. Again, it appears that recent theories about reciprocity
express ideas and tensions stretching back to the term’s origins in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.
The aim of this study has been to uncover these origins. I have located them in
ideas ofmoral equality and the social forces of capitalism. The concept of reciprocity,
I have argued, carried themoral traces of early modern redistributive orders (Chris-
tian charity, noble generosity) and modern commerce (barter, contract). Above all,
I have aimed to explain how the concept evolved from justifying economic liberal-
ism to becoming its “antithesis and alter ego” (Weiner). The French Revolution
marked a key turning point. Before 1789, reciprocity’s egalitarian connotations
were useful for economic liberals in their campaign against privilege, patronage,
and protectionism. After the failure to stabilize a new regime based on liberal eco-
nomic principles after 1789, reciprocity’s ties to economic liberalismwere sundered.
The inequalities produced by capitalism betrayed reciprocity’s promise of equity,
mutual prosperity, and solidarity. Although more research is needed to chart rec-
iprocity’s course across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—occurrences of
130. Ibid., 100.
131. Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972).
132. Marcel Hénaff, Le don des philosophes: Repenser la réciprocité (Paris: Le Seuil, 2012).
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the term run in the tens of thousands rather than the mere hundreds—dictionaries
and prominent texts suggest that reciprocity became the watchword of socialists and
social scientists seeking conceptual alternatives to free-market capitalism.
So perhaps the rise of reciprocity in the humanities and social sciences since the
1980s (ﬁg. A1 and A2) is yet another manifestation of a pattern stretching back
more than two centuries. Perhaps it expresses a desire to imagine social bonds in
terms other than those offered by Homo economicus. If so, it would appear that rec-
iprocity continues to be bound up with capitalism, playing the role of its conceptual
countermovement, its antithesis, its alter ego.
APPENDIX
Figure A1. Articles in JSTOR in which “reciprocity” appears anywhere in the text between 1901
and 2010.
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Figure A2. JSTOR titles (articles and other kinds of academic texts) with “reciprocity” in the do-
mains of history, history of science and technology, and the humanities. The chart shows the relative
proportion of texts using the term in the contexts of commercial trade and sociological or philosoph-
ical analysis.
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Figure A3. Deﬁnition of “réciprocité” in Pierre Larousse’s Grand Dictionnaire universel du XIXe



























































































































































































































































































Figure A5. Comparative frequencies of the French “réciprocité” and the English “reciprocity” in
“TheMaking of theModernWorld” text collection. The percentages refer to the proportion of books
in which the term appears at least once.
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